Reducing preference reversals: the role of preference imprecision and non-transparent methods

José Luis Pinto-Prades, Fernando Ignacio Sánchez-Martínez, José María Abellán-Perpiñán, Jorge E. Martínez-Pérez

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Abstract

Preferences elicited with matching and choice usually diverge (as characterized by preference reversals), violating a basic rationality requirement, namely, procedure invariance. We report the results of an experiment that shows that preference reversals between matching (Standard Gamble in our case) and choice are reduced when the matching task is conducted using non-transparent methods. Our results suggest that techniques based on non-transparent methods are less influenced by biases (i.e. compatibility effects) than transparent methods. We also observe that imprecision of preferences influences the degree of preference reversals. The preference reversal phenomenon is less strong in subjects with more precise preferences.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1230-1246
Number of pages17
JournalHealth Economics
Volume27
Issue number8
Early online date16 May 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2018

Keywords

  • preference reversals
  • procedure invariance
  • choice
  • health measurement
  • matching
  • preference imprecision
  • Standard Gamble

Cite this

Pinto-Prades, J. L., Sánchez-Martínez, F. I., Abellán-Perpiñán, J. M., & Martínez-Pérez , J. E. (2018). Reducing preference reversals: the role of preference imprecision and non-transparent methods. Health Economics, 27(8), 1230-1246. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3772