National Hockey League guaranteed contracts: a principal agent problem impacting on performance

Jon Londry, David Edgar, John Harris, Kevin Grant

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This paper investigates, through the lens of the principal-agent problem, the relationship between payment of National Hockey League (NHL) salaries and player performance during the period 2005-2011 and explores the inherent issues within the NHL player compensation and incentive structure.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1306-1330
    Number of pages25
    JournalManagement Research Review
    Volume38
    Issue number12
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2015

    Keywords

    • National Hockey League
    • player performance
    • guaranteed contracts
    • principal agent problem

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