National Hockey League guaranteed contracts: a principal agent problem impacting on performance

Jon Londry; David Edgar; John Harris; Kevin Grant

doi:10.1108/MRR-06-2014-0146

National Hockey League guaranteed contracts: a principal agent problem impacting on performance

Jon Londry, David Edgar, John Harris, Kevin Grant

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

Abstract

This paper investigates, through the lens of the principal-agent problem, the relationship between payment of National Hockey League (NHL) salaries and player performance during the period 2005-2011 and explores the inherent issues within the NHL player compensation and incentive structure.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1306-1330
Number of pages	25
Journal	Management Research Review
Volume	38
Issue number	12
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1108/MRR-06-2014-0146
Publication status	Published - 2015

Keywords

National Hockey League
player performance
guaranteed contracts
principal agent problem

Documents and Links

10.1108/MRR-06-2014-0146

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Cite this

Londry, J., Edgar, D., Harris, J., & Grant, K. (2015). National Hockey League guaranteed contracts: a principal agent problem impacting on performance. Management Research Review, 38(12), 1306-1330. https://doi.org/10.1108/MRR-06-2014-0146

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abstract = "This paper investigates, through the lens of the principal-agent problem, the relationship between payment of National Hockey League (NHL) salaries and player performance during the period 2005-2011 and explores the inherent issues within the NHL player compensation and incentive structure.",

keywords = "National Hockey League, player performance, guaranteed contracts, principal agent problem",

author = "Jon Londry and David Edgar and John Harris and Kevin Grant",

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KW - principal agent problem

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