Epistemic pluralism and the justification of conceptual strategies in science

Daniel Wegerhoff*, Tony Ward, Louise Dixon

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In recent years, epistemic pluralism has received considerable endorsement as an approach to constructing scientific explanations and pursuing empirical research programs. In this article, we briefly discuss the advantages of an epistemically pluralist approach before outlining our own model of epistemic pluralism. The model we present emphasizes the specific considerations that occur when determining and justifying the selection of conceptual strategies and how conceptual strategies work together to provide task-relevant insights. By clarifying these constraint relationships, we highlight the kinds of systematic considerations that must be taken into account when selecting conceptual strategies for research tasks. We present a case study based on gang research to demonstrate how such considerations occur and the epistemic and pragmatic benefits of doing so.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)443-466
Number of pages24
JournalTheory and Psychology
Volume32
Issue number3
Early online date28 Dec 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2022
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • conceptual strategies
  • criminal justice
  • epistemic pluralism
  • gang research
  • research tasks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Psychology
  • History and Philosophy of Science

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